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Abstract: There is generally no agreed doctrinal definition of universal jurisdiction in customary and 
conventional international law. However, this does not preclude any definition, which embodies the 
essence of the concept as the ability to exercise jurisdiction irrespective of territoriality or nationality. 
Therefore, the concept of universal jurisdiction applies to a situation where "
entitles a State to exercise its jurisdictio
territory, has been perpetrated by a non
the acts." "Universal jurisdiction" refers to the competence of a national court to try a p
suspected of a serious international crime
torture-even if neither the suspect nor the victim are nationals of the country where the court is 
located ("the forum state"), and the crime took pla
legal principle which has evolved in order to overcome jurisdictional gaps in the international legal 
order. It is intended to ensure that those responsible for international crimes 
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and torture 
justice. Universal jurisdiction is primarily enacted when States with a more traditional jurisdictional 
nexus to the crime (related, inter alia, to the pla
prove unable or unwilling to genuinely investigate and prosecute: when their legal system is 
inadequate, or when it is used to shield the accused from justice.
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There are certain crimes in the international law, such as aggression, genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity etc., that affect the interests of all states and pose a 
threat to international peace. Therefo
jurisdiction in relation to these crimes. In international law this is called universal 
jurisdiction principle – 
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Like every concept, “jurisdiction” may have different meanings. The word comes 
from latin roots: “jus” or “juris” means “law” and “dicere” means “to say” or “to 
read”. Therefore, “jurisdiction” can be understood to mean; “to say the law” and, 
as a derivative; “the power to say the law”. Presently, “jurisdiction” is understood 
as the legislative, adjudicative and executive power that provides respectively 
competence to prescribe, adjudicate or execute the law, in particular the territorial 
competence of courts. Jurisdiction in criminal matters may be considered either as 
substantial or procedural law. Customary international law was covering sea 
piracy, slavery, and child and woman trade under universal jurisdiction.  
These crimes were recognized as subject to universal jurisdiction not because they 
were analogous to piracy, as Professor Eugene Kontorovich argues (2004), but 
because of the heinous nature of the crimes. Furthermore, an analogy can be made 
to piracy, not based on whether piracy was or was not outlawed for its heinousness, 
but based on the definition of piracy as a “crime committed more or less 
indiscriminately against citizens of different nations on the high seas.” (Slaughter, 
2006) Third, each of the rationales that have been provided for universal 
jurisdiction, as outlined by Jonathan Marks (2004, pp. 463-471)  
Universal jurisdiction in international criminal cases may be an idea whose time 
has finally come. The germ of the idea is that some crimes are so heinous that they 
give rise to a duty in every nation to prosecute if the opportunity arises. The very 
name "crimes against humanity" captures the notion of an offence to every nation, 
and a corresponding obligation to take action.  
Although the concept is old, and had been offered as one of the justifications for 
the Nuremberg trials of World War II war criminals from 1945 to 1949, it came to 
the fore after the widespread collapse of dictatorships, especially in Latin America, 
during the 1980s. The cry was for "an end to impunity," and the hope was that 
universal jurisdiction would help to bring torturers and murderers to justice. Time 
outs of mind, deposed oppressors have sought amnesty in their own country, or 
have fled into asylum on neutral ground. It often seemed that the worst criminals 
were the most likely to escape justice. (Farmington, 2005, pp. 1110-1123)  
Universal jurisdiction was applicable only to the crimes committed in terra nullius, 
where the jurisdiction of any other country was invalid. It has been argued that 
terra nullius is a requirement of universal jurisdiction, and that when sovereign 
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power has been voluntarily ceded by treaty to grant universal jurisdiction that “in 
effect, the state becomes analogous to terra nullius for purposes of criminal 
jurisdiction. However, this analogy to terra nullius does not somehow transmute 
the territory of a state into terra nullius, not even by legal fiction. 
The main problem of universal jurisdiction lies in the contradiction between the 
universality of its mission and the particularity of the political interests of the 
sovereign nation states which provide the statutory framework for the application 
of the doctrine. The paper explores the nexus between law and politics in the field 
of power, and might even motivate some rulers to put a stop to massive crimes.  
It evaluates, inter alia, the practice of international courts that operate on the basis 
of ad hoc arrangements (such as the Yugoslavia Tribunal set up by the Security 
Council) and compares these arrangements to the structure and functioning of the 
newly established International Criminal Court. The paper further explores the 
long-term prospects of the Court in the framework of a uni-polar world order 
where the only superpower actively opposes the Court as organ of universal 
jurisdiction. (Chapel, 1944, p. 114) 
With this respect D. B. Levin notes that one of the effective ways of transnational 
crime control is to transfer the criminal defendants to the national courts and the 
cases relative to genocide and military crimes included into Geneva Conventions of 
1949 can be heard at the level on national courts, since international law allows 
universal jurisdiction of the national courts with regard to certain transnational 
crimes. (Levin, 1966, p. 48)  
As it was noted above, the principle of universal jurisdiction of national courts is 
reflected in article VI of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. Thus, according to that legal provision, persons charged 
with genocide shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of 
which the act was committed, or the principle of aut judicare-aut dedere (extradite 
or prosecute) shall be applied. “Aut dedere aut judicare” means that States where 
the suspect is have the choice between extraditing or judging him. Most of the UN 
treaties provide for “aut dedere aut judicare” obligations, such as 
- the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft (1963); 
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- the Hague Convention for Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970); 
- the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973; 
- the Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979; 
- the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, 1997. 
“Aut dedere aut judicare” means that States where the suspect is have the choice 
between extraditing or judging him. The application of this treaty was, for 
example, at the center of the dispute between the United States and Libya in the 
Lockerbie case, where the United States demanded the extradition of the suspect on 
the basis of the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed 
on Board Aircraft (1963), where Libyia said that it did not extradite its own 
nationals but would rather judge them. 
The Council of Europe Treaties (the European Convention on the suppression of 
terrorism 1977 and the European Convention on the Protection of the Environment 
1998) provide for formula which are closer to “primo dedere secundo prosequi”, 
which means that states should first extradite the suspect and, only if they cannot, 
should judge him1. 
This principle is also reflected in article 49 of the 1st GC, article 50 of the 2nd GC, 
article 129 of the 3rd GC, article 146 of the 4th GC and paragraph 1, article 85 of the 
Additional Protocol I. (Bekyashev, 2006, pp. 398-400)  
On this point, article 12 of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan Republic reflects the 
modern tendencies of development of the criminal law. This article is called 
“Implementation of the criminal law concerning the persons who have committed a 
crime out of border of the Azerbaijan Republic”.  
Thus, the 1st paragraph of the said article is about the enforceability of the Criminal 
Code beyond the borders of the Azerbaijan Republic with respect of the citizens of 
the Azerbaijan Republic and persons constantly living in the Azerbaijan Republic 
without the citizenship.  
                                                 
1
 Information is taken from - 
www.ecba.org/extdocserv/conferences/madrid2009/Henzelin_ECBAApr09_universaljurisdiction.pdf 
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The article reads: “Citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic and persons constantly 
living on the Azerbaijan Republic without the citizenship, who have committed 
action (action or inaction) out of border of the Azerbaijan Republic, shall be 
instituted to the criminal liability under the present Code, if this action is 
recognized as a crime in the Azerbaijan Republic and in the state on the territory 
of which it was committed, and if these persons were not condemned in the foreign 
state.” 
Paragraph 2 of article 12 of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan Republic covers the 
exterritorial jurisdiction related to foreigners and persons without citizenship (non-
residents). These persons committing a crime outside the limits of the Azerbaijan 
Republic, shall be prosecuted under the present Code, in cases, if the crime shall be 
directed against the citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic, against the interests of the 
Azerbaijan Republic, and also in the cases, stipulated by international agreements 
to which the Azerbaijan Republic is a party, if these persons were not condemned 
in the foreign state. Thus, this legal provision defines the principle of universal 
jurisdiction irrespective of a person committing the crime or a place of the 
committed crime. (Samandarov, 2003) 
Not only does criminal law – as law in general – require the absence of selectivity, 
in whichever form, in the application of the norms; of equal importance for the rule 
of law in any given framework, whether domestic, international or eventually 
supranational, is a functioning separation of powers. The independence of the 
judiciary is of vital importance for the legitimacy of its decisions.  
This requirement, particularly in relation to a clear distinction between judicial and 
executive powers, has been difficult to achieve at the domestic level; it has proven 
to be highly problematic – in certain cases almost impossible to implement – at the 
transnational level where the interests of sovereign states are at stake.  
This has been evidenced in all projects of international trials, whether implemented 
or not, since the era of the First World War. In order to have any meaning at all, the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction – with its implicit appeal to the conscience of 
mankind – requires the highest standards of separation of powers. It is based on the 
universal recognition of human rights and evokes ideals of justice, impartiality and 
fairness which are in turn related to, though not dependent upon, the preservation 
of peace on a global scale. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
JURIDICA 
 
115 
question has been up to what extent, if at all, the expectations raised by the 
proclamation of universal jurisdiction, implying the idea of universal justice, can 
be met under the conditions of international real politic.  
As a philosophical principle, universal jurisdiction dates back to a much earlier 
period than the twentieth century. The idea can be traced back to “articles of war” 
proclaimed in the 14th century. So far, virtually all examples of the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction have been flawed; they have simply not met the high 
standards set by the doctrine (Kochler, 2003)1. 
The implementation of universal jurisdiction to the cases considered as core crimes 
in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (was adopted at a diplomatic 
conference in Rome on 17 July 1998 and it entered into force on 1 July 2002) such 
as of genocide, crime against the humanity and war crimes is widely recognized. 
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court [ICC] are 
listed in article 5 thereof: a) the crime of genocide; b) crimes against humanity; c) 
war crimes; d) the crime of aggression. [article 5(1)]2.  
Member States or States ratifying the Geneva Conventions are liable to implement 
the provisions of these Conventions. The liability related to the actions described in 
these articles arises irrespective of the circumstances of international or interstate 
conflicts.  
According to article 11 of the Statute (jurisdiction ratione temporis), the Court has 
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this 
Statute. However according to article 29 the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court committed after 1 July 2002 (effective date of Statute according to article 
126) shall not be subject to any statute of limitations. On 16 August 1996 
Azerbaijan ratified the important international agreement – Convention on the 
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against 
                                                 
1
 On the normative relation between the goals of peace and security on the one hand and (criminal) 
justice on the other see, inter alia, the author’s analysis in his 1999 Memorandum on the Yugoslav war 
crimes tribunal: Global Justice or Global Revenge? International Criminal Justice at the Crossroads. 
Philosophical Reflections on the Principles of the International Legal Order Published on the 
Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Foundation of the International Progress Organization. 
(Vienna/New York): Springer, p. 353. 
2
 Rome Statute of International Criminal Court (2001) International Law Magazine, (Baku). № 6.p.13 
(in Azeri). 
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Humanity, 26 November 1968 and started to implement its under this convention 
to the national criminal legislation.1 
Universal jurisdiction principle also prevents the persons convicted in international 
crimes to ask for a political asylum or apply for a refugee status. This provision is 
included into paragraph 2, article 1 of the Declaration “on Territorial Asylum” 
dated December 14th 1967 and into paragraph 1(e) of the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. As may be noted, in accordance with the universal 
jurisdiction principle, the persons committing the said crimes shall be prosecuted 
irrespective of place of crime or their personality. (Lukashuk & Naumov, 1999, p. 
38)  
Matters relating to territorial and exterritorial jurisdiction within criminal law as a 
part of the national legal system are very relevant and have great practical 
importance. It may be said the criminal legislation of most of the countries describe 
the territorial application of the principles of criminal law differently. This is due to 
the internationalisation of the social event, like crime, as a result of 
internationalisation of the social life. Therefore the internationalisation of both 
criminal legislation and the activities of law-enforcement agencies are necessary. 
We must admit that unlike the legislative and law-enforcement authorities of the 
states, the transnational crime adapts to the new conditions more swiftly. 
(Lukashuk, 1998, p. 85) 
The predicament of universal jurisdiction has always lied in the virtual 
impossibility of reconciling politics with law in a framework which is determined 
by the interplay of forces among states as primary subjects of international law. As 
history has shown, the problems and obstacles are manifold.  
Court decisions, if not backed up by the power of “willing” states, remain mere 
recommendations – and the “executive” support for international criminal justice 
always has its price in terms of the national interests of the “willing” states 
becoming part of supposedly purely judicial considerations.  
The practice of international criminal justice under the conditions of real politic 
further suffers from a serious credibility problem insofar as the interests of 
                                                 
1
 Information is taken from - 
www.ecba.org/extdocserv/conferences/madrid2009/Henzelin_ECBAApr09_universaljurisdiction.pdf 
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involved states almost unavoidably impose upon it a “judicial policy of double 
standards.” Inconsistencies in the application of legal norms are part and parcel of 
the delivery of justice in the power-centred framework of relations between states.  
Because of the perceived “pitfalls” of universal jurisdiction – as they were 
articulated by Henry Kissinger, who obviously addressed the issue pro domo –, 
political leaders have generally tended to limit its scope and tie its application to 
specific political circumstances, something which explains the rather erratic course 
of international criminal justice, including often legally inconsistent court 
judgments, since after the Second World War. (Kissinger, 2001, pp. 86-96) 
E. T. Usenko notes that in the event if the exterritorial activity of the state laws 
conflicts with or violates the rights and legal interests of other countries, the said 
country cannot refer to such laws. (Usenko, 1996, p. 145)  
Jurisdiction is absolute and exclusive. Territorial jurisdiction is based on the 
territorial principle. There are two principles of the territorial jurisdiction: A) 
Objective territorial jurisdiction principle; B) Subjective territorial jurisdiction 
principle.  
According to the objective territorial jurisdiction principle, the state will have 
jurisdiction on the legal violations completed within its borders. In this case any 
part of the crime can be committed out of borders of the state. Subjective territorial 
jurisdiction principle is opposite to the objective territorial jurisdiction. Thus the 
state will have jurisdiction over the crimes started in its territory. In this case part 
of such crime can be committed in another country or the crime may be completed 
in another country. Territorial principle is the territorial reflection of the state 
sovereignty. (Huseynov, 2000, p. 84)  
The highly problematic nature of the exercise of universal jurisdiction – insofar as 
its lack of consistency and the application of double standards are concerned – has 
been particularly obvious in the framework of ad hoc arrangements. The 
“temptations of victor’s justice,” inherent in any power-centred form of criminal 
justice, have been greatest – and the most difficult to control – in the tribunals that 
have been set up following or in connection with armed conflicts, whether 
domestic or international.  
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This has been evident in the post-World War II military tribunals, the tribunals 
established by the United Nations Security Council since the end of the Cold War, 
the courts set up on the basis of mixed domestic transnational arrangements such as 
those for Sierra Leone and Cambodia, as well as certain courts and tribunals that, 
though officially of domestic nature, are de facto set up and controlled by an 
occupying power (as in the case of Iraq).  
In all these cases, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction has been invoked in 
different variations, while in reality the respective arrangements of criminal justice 
have amounted, to a considerable extent at least, to the settling of scores by the 
victorious party (or parties) with the vanquished, something which has also been 
the case with the Security Council’s ad hoc tribunals. This predicament has been 
eloquently articulated more than six decades ago by Judge Radhabinod Pal in his 
dissenting opinion in the judgment of the Tokyo Tribunal: “It has been said that a 
victor can dispense to the vanquished everything from mercy to vindictiveness; but 
the one thing the victor cannot give to the vanquished is justice.”1 
These developments correspond with the characterization and increasing 
importance of peremptory rules in international law, the distinction between 
international delicts and international crimes in the context of the international 
responsibility of states, and the extension and fleshing out of the principle that 
states have a responsibility for activities originating on their territory and 
encroaching on the security of other states (Graefralh, 1980, p. 395). 
At the same time, however, these developments raise difficult questions and meet 
with considerable obstacles in the area of criminal law, and – though they may try - 
states cannot minimize the difficulties by referring to outdated concepts of 
sovereignty. For a long time, the question of international implementation of 
criminal law was approached from the viewpoint of the need to prevent possible 
interference with state sovereignty and not from that of the need for coordinated 
struggle and cooperation in the fight against international crimes.  
                                                 
1
 Judgment of Mr. Justice Pal, Member from India,” in: B. V. A. Roling and C. F. Ruter (eds.), The 
Tokyo Judgment. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946 – 
12 November 1948. Volume II: Judgment of the  Member from India. Opinion of the Member from 
the Netherlands. Amsterdam: APA – University Press Amsterdam BV, 1977, p. 1037. 
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Thus, states either cited the sovereignty principle as justification for objecting to 
the extension of universal criminal jurisdiction or as justification for rejecting the 
establishment of an international criminal court. 
This situation continues to exist today, though in a different fashion; there is 
increasing recognition that national security is at present achievable only by way of 
international cooperation. In this context, however, one cannot underestimate the 
importance of the fact that states are the essential structural elements of today's 
international legal order, that they represent the effective political organizational 
form of peoples and that they have particular protective functions which they 
actually exercise. 
However compelling the precept of cooperation may be, all states want to ensure 
that other states will not be permitted to use criminal law to interfere with their 
sovereignty or to achieve goals incompatible with the interests of the international 
community and peoples' right to self-determination.  
To date, the industrially strong Western powers have decisively opposed universal 
criminal jurisdiction in the context of a code of offences against the peace and 
security of mankind fearing that they might thereby lose rights of diplomatic 
protection for their citizens or be forced to recognize criminal judgments of states 
whose legal systems they do not wish to respect as being of equivalent right.  
Fundamentally, the Western powers base their position on the principle of 
sovereignty, that is sovereignty vis-a-vis the criminal jurisdiction of other states. 
They cite the principle to justify their non-recognition of foreign criminal 
judgments, their refusal to extradite their own citizens, and their attempts to claim 
immunity for persons who were acting as state agents when they committed 
international crimes.  
The Western powers do not wish national courts to be empowered to judge the 
conduct of foreign governments. This essentially means removing recognition of 
the international nature of the crimes defined in the code1.  
Persons with diplomatic immunity can use the criminal legislation jurisdiction. The 
immunity of a diplomatic representative from the criminal jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Belgium UN Doc. A/43/525, at 3. 
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receiving state was, in earlier literature, regarded as indistinguishable from his 
personal inviolability.  
At the time when the principle of personal inviolability was first clearly 
established, it was unusual for criminal proceedings to take place without prior 
arrest and detention of the accused. But as time passed and the arrest and detention 
of the accused was not essential for criminal proceeding, diplomatic immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction emerged as a separate principle of diplomatic law.  
As such the decision of the International Court on the case of Congo Democratic 
Republic against the Belgium (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) is 
very important. The brief overview of the case is as follows: On 11 April 2000 an 
investigating judge of the Brussels Tribunal de Première Instance issued "an 
international arrest warrant in absentia" against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, 
charging him, as perpetrator or co-perpetrator, with offences constituting grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional Protocols 
thereto, and with crimes against humanity. 
The arrest warrant was circulated on an international level via Interpol. On 17 
October 2000, Congo filed in the Registry an Application instituting the present 
proceedings, in which the Court was requested "to declare that the Kingdom of 
Belgium shall annul the international arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000". 
From the beginning the Court declared that the international law accepts the 
immunity of the State Officials like diplomatic and consulate agents, including 
heads of state, heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs from the civil 
and criminal jurisdiction of other countries.  
The Court indicated that the parties referred to number of protocols, including 
Vienna Convention “on Diplomatic Relations” dated April 18, 1961 and New York 
Convention “On Special Missions” dated December 8th 1969.  
Referring to the few existing decisions of national high courts, such as the Great 
Britain House of Lords (Pinochet case, March 24, 1999) and the Court of Cassation 
in France (Qaddafi case, March 13, 2001) the Court concluded that immunity was 
not granted to state officials for their own benefit, but to ensure the effective 
performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States; and when 
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abroad that they enjoy full immunity from arrest in another State on a criminal 
charge including charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity.  
In its Judgment, the Court found, by 13 votes to 3, "that the issue against Mr. 
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, and its 
international circulation, constituted violations of a legal obligation of the 
Kingdom of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that they 
failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability 
which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo enjoyed under international law". Therefore, the Court found by 10 
votes to 6, "that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, 
cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so inform the authorities to whom 
that warrant was circulated"1.  
I would like to note that the international court in most of its cases refers to 
customary norms. The Statute of the International Court of Justice interprets 
international custom, as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. In order 
to become an international custom the norm must consist of two components: state 
practice (usus) and the belief that, from the objective legal point of view the 
practice is obligatory, forbidden or permitted depending on the character of the 
norm (i.e. opinio juris sive necessitatis – an opinion of law or necessity)2.  
According to Brownlie “almost all countries have the jurisdiction over the foreign 
citizens committing any action affecting the security of the state. This concept 
includes, but not limited to different political crimes. Currency, immigration and 
economical crimes are punished according to this rule”. The principle of 
protection (or security) must ensure the protection of the important interests of the 
state and its citizens from the criminal actions committed out of borders of the 
country. (Brownlie, 1977, pp. 433-434)  
According to the international standards on human rights and freedom nobody 
“shall be instituted to criminal liability twice for the same crime”.  
                                                 
1
 Information is taken from official internet site of the International Court of Justice- http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3.  
2
 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 38 (1) (b). (in Turkish). 
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However Christine van den Wyngaertt notes that the “non bis in idem” principle in 
respect of one person will depend on competition of jurisdictions of several states 
(Van Den Wyngaert, 1999, p. 708).  
The European Convention makes no express reference to non bis in idem but 
article 4(1) of Additional Protocol 7 to the European Convention declares that “No 
one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the 
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally 
acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that 
State.”  
However, article 4(2) makes specific provision to re-open a case in accordance 
with national laws if there are new or newly discovered facts or if there has been 
serious defect in the previous proceedings, which could have affected the outcome 
of the case. Article 4(2) is also flexible enough to accommodate different domestic 
approaches. The sub-article provides that the principle does not in any way limit 
the right of convicted persons to re-open of the case in circumstances permitted 
under national law.  
There are numerous cases in practice when the state grants an absolute discharge to 
its citizen without justification, however conviction of the same person in a 
different country on the basis of the universal jurisdiction shall not mean the 
violation of the “non bis in idem” principle, on the contrary it will play an 
important role in rectification of an injustice. (Safarov, 2004)1 
For example, in 1998 a Mauritanian army officer Ould Dah visited France as part 
of his military training. There he was arrested by the French authorities and 
prosecuted for acts of torture committed in Mauritania in 1990-1991. However, it 
must be noted that in 1993, Mauritania adopted an amnesty law which safeguarded 
the applicant against prosecution. (Ould Dah v. France) The applicant's main 
complaint was that France has violated the prohibition of retroactive punishment 
(article 7 of the Convention of European Court of Human Rights). The Court 
reiterated that France has not violated any of the articles of the Convention and the 
applicant’s complain is inadmissible. The Court observed that the United Nations 
Convention against Torture of 1984 (Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
                                                 
1
 About some aspects of implementation of the “non bis in idem” principle, Azerbaijan Law 
Magazine. (Baku). № 1, p. 128. (in Russian). 
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – UNC, 1984) was ratified by 
France in 1987 and had been incorporated into French law.  
Therefore, at the material time the “absolute necessity” of prohibiting and 
penalising torture in France was justified. French courts declared that they had 
jurisdiction to try the case in the exercise of universal jurisdiction, and also that 
they would apply French law. Otherwise, application of the Mauritanian amnesty 
law, which served merely to grant impunity to the perpetrators of torture, would 
deprive the universal jurisdiction (i.e. the right of States to prosecute the 
perpetrators of acts of torture irrespective to the place or personality) provided for 
by the United Nations Convention of 1984 of its substance. Like the United 
Nations Committee of Human Rights and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
former Yugoslavia, the Court considered that an amnesty law was generally 
incompatible with the duty on States to investigate acts of torture or barbarity1.  
 
Conclusion 
While the project of universal jurisdiction requires the highest standards of the rule 
of law – similar to, or even higher than, those applied in any domestic 
constitutional system – its predicament is revealed in the truth according to which 
the reality of international relations is still one of power politics, whereby relations 
between states are conducted on the basis of the assertion of national sovereignty. 
International criminal jurisdiction, for all its failings, is going to compensate for 
some of the weaknesses of domestic criminal jurisdiction; it is going to act in some 
cases where local social and political forces prevent a domestic prosecution.  
That will be a net gain, even if international prosecution is not possible in many 
cases and perhaps not even in the ones we would most like to see prosecuted. The 
combination of universal criminal jurisdiction of states and an international 
criminal court is a system which meets the criteria for effective implementation of 
the Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 
  
                                                 
1
 Information is taken from http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2009/03/amnesty-and-torture.html 
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